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Abstract
Review of A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin
Press, 2013. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.
Keywords
.
This open access article is available in Human Biology: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/humbiol/vol86/iss3/7
1Department of Anthropology, University of Texas at Austin. E-mail: jenniferrafff@utexas.edu.
Human Biology, Summer 2014, v. 86, no. 3, pp. 227–232. Copyright © 2015 Wayne State University Press, Detroit, Michigan 48201
book review
Nicholas Wade and Race: Building a Scientiﬁ c Façade
Jennifer Rafff 1
A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin Press, 
2014. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.
For he will say to himself that he has no right to 
give names to objects which he cannot defĳine.
—Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man
Do “races” exist as meaningful biological categories?1 Physical anthropologists and human biologists have been studying race 
(e.g., blacks vs. whites, or Europeans vs. Asians) for 
centuries. For most of that time they subscribed to 
the perspective that race was a taxonomic category, 
and they sought to identify the biological traits 
(e.g., cranial shape or skin color) that characterized 
and defĳined these diffferent groups. This perspective 
assumed that each individual was a member of a 
single racial category, that the diffferences between 
racial categories were biological, and that these cat-
egories were predictive of other traits like ancestry, 
temperament, intelligence, or health (Linnaeus 
1758; Morton 1839; Hooton 1939).
But it gradually became clear that this clas-
sifĳicatory approach was not scientifĳically sound. 
Grouping people by skin color into “continental 
races” (Africans, Asians, Europeans) did not pro-
duce the same result as grouping people by skull 
shape or by such traits as susceptibility to sickle 
cell disease (Livingstone 1962; Relethford 2009). 
Furthermore, as scientists began to study human 
variation with the tools of genetics, it became 
obvious that human genetic variation does not 
divide humans into a few discrete groups. There are 
virtually no sharp boundaries, either with physical 
features or with patterns of genetic diversity, that 
show where one population “ends” and the next 
“begins” (Livingstone 1962; Lewontin 1972; Jorde 
et al. 2000; Relethford 2009; Long et al. 2009; 
Templeton 2013).
These observations have led the majority of 
physical anthropologists, human biologists, human 
geneticists, and sociologists in recent decades to 
conclude that the racial groups we recognize are 
social categories constructed in a specifĳic cultural 
and historical setting, even if we consider physi-
cal features when categorizing people (Pigliucci 
2013; Duster 2005). These social categories have 
biological consequences; for example, someone 
who experiences the stress of racism may be more 
likely to develop high blood pressure and hyperten-
sion than someone who does not (Gravlee 2009; 
Sullivan 2013).
However, according to former New York Times 
science writer Nicholas Wade, we should never 
have stopped thinking of race as a biological 
taxonomic category. In his book A Troublesome 
Inheritance, Wade takes it upon himself to educate 
scientists about the errors of our interpretations of 
human genetic diversity.
Wade claims that the latest genomic fĳindings 
actually support dividing humans into discrete 
races and that the genetic makeup of diffferent 
races contributes to behavioral and economic dis-
parities. In a spectacular failure of logic, he asserts 
that those who disagree that races are meaningful 
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biological categories in humans must also think 
that human populations do not difffer genetically 
or have not been afffected by evolution.
There is a lot to criticize in this book, particu-
larly Wade’s imaginative storytelling in chapters 
6–10 (“a much more speculative arena,” as he puts 
it [15]). He explains that English populations have a 
“willingness to save and delay gratifĳication,” which 
“seems considerably weaker in tribal societies” 
(184–185), and these diffferences must be geneti-
cally based, despite his admission that “the genetic 
underpinnings of human social behavior are for 
the most part still unknown” (15). In chapter 8, 
he asserts that Jews are adapted for capitalism in 
a manner analogous to the Eskimo’s adaptation 
to survival in an Arctic environment (214)—an 
assertion unsupported by scientifĳic evidence, 
to put it mildly. (Wade seems to be unaware of 
the consequences of laws prohibiting Jews from 
owning land and farming over much of Europe 
for centuries—and instead speculates that “the 
adaptation of Jews to capitalism is another such 
evolutionary process” [214].)
But the central foundation of Wade’s argu-
ment is the scientifĳic justifĳication of the folk 
classifĳication of race. He writes: “At least at the 
level of continental populations, races can be 
distinguished genetically, and this is sufffĳicient to 
establish that they exist” (122). If Wade is right and 
races are distinct biological categories, then we 
would reasonably expect that they would be un-
ambiguously diffferent from each other genetically 
and physically (as well as behaviorally, according 
to Wade). One should be able to defĳine each race 
with a set of objective criteria, which could be used 
by any person to independently reach the same 
classifĳications (and number of classifĳications) as 
Wade. Furthermore, these categories should have 
predictive power; that is, features that defĳine race 
should be in concordance with new discoveries of 
genetic diversity.
What Is Race, According to Wade?
Wade never provides a clear defĳinition of “race” in 
this book. He tries to rely instead on loose associa-
tions rather than defĳinitive characteristics, which 
forces him (like Hooton 1918, 1931) to conclude 
both that physical traits defĳine race but that the 
traits can vary from person to person: “Races are 
identifĳied by clusters of traits, and to belong to a 
certain race, it’s not necessary to possess all of the 
identifying traits” (121).
With such a shifty, casual footing, it’s no sur-
prise that Wade’s conclusions are unsound. He 
can’t keep the number of races straight (see Table 
1). Wade can’t settle on a defĳinite number of races 
because he can’t come up with a consistent, rigor-
ous defĳinition of what “race” means. He freely uses 
such terms as “major race,” “race,” “subrace,” “group,” 
and “population” but doesn’t provide any serious, 
objective ways to distinguish among these terms 
for arbitrary groupings of people.2
Wade seems to realize the contradictory claims 
of his premise but tries to have it both ways: “Such 
an arrangement, of portioning human variation 
into fĳive continental races, is to some extent arbi-
trary. But it makes practical sense. The three major 
races are easy to recognize. The fĳive-way division 
matches the known events of human population 
history. And, most signifĳicant of all, the division by 
continent is supported by genetics” (94).
To support this claim, Wade relies heavily on 
Table 1. Various Numbers of Races Referred to by Wade in A Troublesome Inheritance
Number of Races Deﬁ nition Page
 3 Africans, East Asians, Europeans, “as well as many smaller groups” 2
 3 Africans, East Asians, Caucasians (doesn’t mention Native Americans) 4
 5 Africans, East Asians, Caucasians, Native Americans, Australians/Papua New Guineans 64
 3 Caucasians, East Asians, Africans 70
 7 Five continental races, Indian subcontinent, people of the Middle East 96
 5 or 7 Five continental groups but two additional groups recognized genetically: Central/Southern Asia and Middle East 100
 4 European, East Asian, American Indian, African 115
 3 “Major races” 121
 5 “Major races” 242
 
a study published by Rosenberg et al. (2002) that 
used a program called Structure to group people 
based on similarities in short tandem repeat mark-
ers distributed across the genome. He notes that 
the program identifĳied fĳive major clusters in this 
2002 study, which corresponded to the major 
geographic regions of the world (Africa, Eurasia, 
East Asia, Oceania, and America). Therefore, Wade 
argues, these results clearly show that humans 
are divided up into racial categories that match 
continents.
Charles Murray, coauthor with Richard Her-
rnstein of the book The Bell Curve (1994)—which 
claimed that genetically based diffferences in 
intelligence between blacks and whites (as mea-
sured by IQ) could explain social and economic 
disparities, and was widely criticized (see Alland 
et al. 1996)—recently reviewed Wade’s book in the 
Wall Street Journal. He stated that “a computer given 
a random sampling of bits of DNA that are known 
to vary among humans—from among the millions 
of them—will cluster them into groups that cor-
respond to the self-identifĳied race or ethnicity of the 
subjects. This is not because the software assigns the 
computer that objective but because those are the 
clusters that provide the best statistical fĳit” (Mur-
ray 2014) But Wade and Murray are both wrong. 
While the program Structure can be a useful tool 
for inferring individual ancestry, it requires (1) an 
understanding of the assumptions inherent in the 
clustering algorithms and (2) cautious interpreta-
tion of the results. Because of these caveats, careful 
and rigorous scientists generally view the “best” 
clustering scheme as a starting point for generating 
testable hypotheses about ancestry and population 
history, not as the basis for slicing the species into a 
discrete number of groups or races.
Structure is a program that assigns individual 
genotypes to hypothetical populations or ancestry 
groupings (Bolnick 2008). It assumes that popula-
tions are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and that 
loci are not in linkage disequilibrium (Pritchard 
et al. 2000). Results produced from this analytical 
tool are extremely sensitive to a number of factors, 
including models (i.e., correlated vs. uncorrelated 
allele frequencies), the type and number of genetic 
variants studied, and the number of populations 
included in the analysis (Rosenberg et al. 2005). 
The authors of Structure also caution that it will 
produce rather arbitrary clusters when sampled 
populations exhibit clinal patterns of genetic varia-
tion due to isolation by distance (Pritchard et al. 
2000). This description applies to most human 
populations, so it makes the results of Structure 
problematic and difffĳicult to interpret in many 
cases. In fact, Rosenberg et al. (2005) explicitly 
stated: “Our evidence for clustering should not be 
taken as evidence of our support of any particular 
concept of ‘biological race.’”
Contrary to Wade’s assertion, Structure didn’t 
simply identify fĳive clusters in the Rosenberg et al. 
(2002) data set. It also identifĳied two, three, four, 
six, and seven clusters.3 Why? Researchers using 
Structure have to defĳine the number (K) of clus-
ters in advance, because that’s what the program 
requires. So where does Wade get the idea that K 
= 5 is the most statistically supported number of 
clusters? Not from Rosenberg et al. (2002).
There are a few statistical methods for iden-
tifying which choice of K is “best.” Structure itself 
provides an estimate of the log probability of the 
data for each value of K [lnP(D)]. However, using 
this estimate to choose among values of K is not 
without some controversy—the authors of Struc-
ture caution that it “merely provides an ad hoc ap-
proximation” and the “biological interpretation of 
K may not be straightforward” (Pritchard et al. 2010: 
15). In their simulation study, Evanno et al. (2005) 
observed that lnP(D) wasn’t necessarily maximized 
at the correct value for K. They recommend instead 
the measure of ΔK, or the second-order rate of 
change of the likelihood function with respect to 
K (essentially, how much better each value of K is 
compared with the preceding value of K). Many 
researchers follow this practice, although it has 
been argued against (Waples and Gaggiotti 2006).
Importantly, Rosenberg et al. (2002, 2005) 
do not report the lnP(D) (or ΔK) for any of the 
values for K, so those articles do not tell us which 
number of clusters are most likely present in the 
data set. Bolnick (2008) reports information about 
the unpublished lnP(D) values:
No single value of K clearly maximized the prob-
ability of the observed data. Probabilities increased 
sharply from K = 1 to K = 4 but were fairly similar for 
values of K ranging from 4 to 20. The probability 
of the observed data was higher for K = 6 than for 
smaller values of K, but not as high for some repli-
cates of larger values of K. The highest Pr (X|K) was 
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associated with a particular replicate of K = 16, but 
that value of K was also associated with very low 
probabilities when the individuals were grouped 
into 16 clusters in other ways. Consequently it is 
uncertain which number of genetic clusters best 
fĳits this data set, but there is no clear evidence 
that K = 6 is the best estimate. (Bolnick 2008, 
77; based on information provided by personal 
communication from N. Rosenberg)
Wade does not seem to have read any of the pa-
pers critical of interpretations of Rosenberg et 
al.’s (2002) data as evidence for human racial divi-
sions, such as Bolnick (2008) or Templeton (2013). 
Nor does he seem to have noticed Rosenberg et 
al.’s (2002) omission of any statistical evaluation 
of the diffferent K values. They do highlight “six 
main genetic clusters, fĳive of which correspond 
to major geographic regions” within the abstract, 
making one wonder whether Wade carefully read 
the rest of the paper. I would like to believe that a 
veteran science reporter would not be so cavalier 
as to selectively read only sources that support 
his position. Wade evidently seems to like K = 5 
simply because it matches the number of inhabited 
continents: “It might be reasonable to elevate the 
Indian and Middle Eastern groups to the level of 
major races, making seven in all. But then many 
more subpopulations could be declared races, so 
to keep things simple, the fĳive-race, continent-
based scheme seems the most practical for most 
purposes” (100). Practical. Simple. Wade wants 
us to cut up human diversity into fĳive races not 
because that’s what the statistical analyses support 
but because thinking about it as a gradient is hard.
Nobody (least of  all contributors to this 
journal!) is denying that humans vary physically 
and genetically. But observed patterns of human 
genetic diversity simply don’t fĳit with any scien-
tifĳically viable defĳinition of race as a taxonomic 
unit (Templeton 2013). In order to fĳind biological 
support for folk classifĳications of race, Wade has 
decided that certain patterns of variation are more 
important than others. The fĳive-part division of 
races seems “logical” to Wade because there are 
fĳive continents. Anticipating confusion on this 
point, he claims: “Those who assert that human 
races don’t exist like to point to the many, mutu-
ally inconsistent classifĳication schemes that have 
recognized anywhere from 3 to 60 races. But the 
lack of agreement doesn’t mean that races don’t 
exist, only that it is a matter of judgment as to how 
to defĳine them” (92, emphasis mine).
So, rather than being defĳined by empirical cri-
teria, as Wade had asserted so confĳidently earlier 
in the book, it really is just a subjective judgment 
call. The diffferences between groups are so subtle 
and gradual that no objective lines can be drawn, 
so Wade draws his own on the basis of his own pre-
conceptions. In other words, he can’t defĳine distinct 
races. He just knows them when he sees them.
There is a great deal more in this book that 
deserves critique, such as Wade’s assertion that 
the genetic diffferences between human groups 
determine behavioral diffferences, resurrecting the 
specter of “national character” and “racial tempera-
ments.” But as I have shown here, it’s all pseudo-
scientifĳic rubbish because he can’t justify his fĳirst 
and primary point: that the human racial groups 
we recognize today are scientifĳically meaningful, 
distinct biological divisions of humans.
Finally, it is worth noting that, throughout 
the book, Wade repeatedly calls attention to the 
fact that his view on race is contrary to that of 
anthropologists and sociologists. In responses to 
criticisms of his book (including an earlier online 
version of this review) he insists that “by denying 
the existence of race, social scientists are intimi-
dating biologists from pursuing this path” (Wade 
2014)—a claim belied by the robust criticism of 
his book by geneticists, evolutionary biologists, and 
physical anthropologists). This ploy is a variation 
on the Galileo fallacy: the fact that one bravely 
holds a minority view in science is considered to be 
sufffĳicient evidence of the worth of one’s position. I 
have seen it used over and over again in responses 
to criticisms of pseudoscience, and it is no more 
persuasive for Wade than it is for creationists or 
homeopaths.
notes  
 1. This review incorporates material that has previously 
appeared in the Hufffĳington Post (www.hufffĳingtonpost.
com/jennifer-rafff/nicholas-wade-and-race-building-
a-scientifĳic-facade_b_5375137.html) and Violent 
Metaphors (http://violentmetaphors.com/2014/05/21/
nicholas-wade-and-race-building-a-scientifĳic-facade/).
 2. See Agustín Fuentes’s online debate with Wade sponsored 
by the American Anthropological Association, available 
at https://aaanetevents.webex.com/ec0701lsp11/
eventcenter/recording/recordAction.do?theAction-
=poprecord&AT=pb&internalRecordTicket=48325-
34b000000021dea9fffff10e4adbe92477105faf7337d575
f8022218d05fffd3d0cede6594483c&renewticket=0&is
urlact=true&recordID=8614987&apiname=lsr.php&f
ormat=short&needFilter=false&&SP=EC&rID=86149
87&RCID=e801bfd96855006077205e3d2e023699&si
teurl=aaanetevents&actappname=ec0701lsp11&actn
ame=%2Feventcenter%2Fframe%2Fg.do&rnd=5083
844903&entappname=url0201lsp11&entactname=%
2FnbrRecordingURL.do.
 3. It actually identifĳied up to 20 divisions, but clusters 
1–7 are the primary ones discussed in Rosenberg et al. 
(2002). The same study also divided their worldwide 
sample up into regions, and then ran Structure within 
those regions, to look at fĳiner-scale population structure 
(see Bolnick 2008).
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